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ABSTRACT. The optimal capital structure model with endogenous bankruptcy was first studied by Leland
[30] and Leland and Toft [31], and was later extended to the spectrally negative Le´vy model by Hilberink
and Rogers [22] and Kyprianou and Surya [27]. This paper incorporates scale effects by allowing the values
of bankruptcy costs and tax benefits to be dependent on the firm’s asset value. By using the fluctuation
identities for the spectrally negative Le´vy process, we obtain a candidate bankruptcy level as well as a
sufficient condition for optimality. The optimality holds in particular when, monotonically in the asset
value, the value of tax benefits is increasing, the loss amount at bankruptcy is increasing, and its proportion
relative to the asset value is decreasing. The solution admits a semi-explicit form in terms of the scale
function. A series of numerical studies are given to analyze the impacts of scale effects on the bankruptcy
strategy and the optimal capital structure.
Keywords: Credit risk, spectrally negative Le´vy processes, scale functions, optimal stopping
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 60G40, 60G51, 91G40
1. INTRODUCTION
We revisit the Leland-Toft optimal capital structure model [31] with endogenous bankruptcy. A firm
is partly financed by debt of equal seniority that is continuously retired and reissued so that its maturity
profile is kept constant through time. It distributes a continuous stream of coupon payments to bond-
holders, on which the firm receives tax benefits. The model assumes that the shareholders have the right
to determine the time of bankruptcy so as as to maximize the firm’s equity value subject to the limited
liability constraint. This gives a framework for obtaining the optimal capital structure that solves the
tradeoff between minimizing bankruptcy costs and maximizing tax benefits.
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This model was first studied by [30, 31] where they assumed a geometric Brownian motion for the
firm’s asset value, and was later extended to a Le´vy model, among others, by [13, 14, 22, 27, 29]. By
introducing jumps, it allows the value of bankruptcy costs to be stochastic, and more importantly resolves
the contradictory conclusion under the continuous diffusion model that the credit spreads go to zero as
the maturity decreases to zero. The problem reduces to a non-standard optimal stopping problem, and
the optimal bankruptcy level can be obtained via the continuous/smooth fit principle. It was solved, in
particular, for the double exponential jump diffusion process [13], for stable processes [29], and for a
general spectrally negative Le´vy process [22, 27].
In this paper, we add more dynamics to the Le´vy model by incorporating the “scale effect” or the
inhomogeneity with respect to the firm size. Despite the fascinating contributions of the aforementioned
papers, there are several assumptions on the bankruptcy costs and tax benefits, which are rather artificially
imposed to derive explicit/analytical solutions. This paper is aimed to relax these assumptions. Here we
review the assumptions required in [31] and its extensions and also give empirical evidence that motivates
us to relax these assumptions.
Bankruptcy costs: Regarding the bankruptcy costs, it is commonly assumed that their value is pro-
portional to the firm’s asset value at the time of bankruptcy. However, this is empirically rejected, and it
is widely accepted that the amount of bankruptcy costs as a ratio of the asset value is dependent on the
size of the firm. Following [2, 39], we call this the scale effect.
One of the earliest empirical studies was conducted by Warner [39] where he observed this effect
based on the direct bankruptcy costs of the 11 railroad companies that liquidated between 1933 and
1955. In Figure 1, we apply linear regressions to Figures 1 and 2 of [39], which plot, respectively, the
bankruptcy costs and their percentages relative to the market values of the firms. Although this is not
a careful analysis of these data, it is still reasonable to conclude that, while the cost tends to increase,
its proportion relative to the firm value tends to decrease. Ang et al. [2] also confirmed this, observing
via regression methods the strict concavity of the bankruptcy cost function based on the bankruptcy data
between 1963 and 1978 in the Western District of Oklahoma. The scale effect is also consistent with the
more recent and comprehensive empirical studies conducted by [11] under corporate bankruptcy data in
Arizona and New York between 1995 and 2001.
These empirical results only consider the direct costs, typically consisting of legal and administrative
costs. On the other hand, indirect costs are in general much harder to compute, and the estimation tends
to vary heavily on the nature of the data and also on the approximation methods. While the exact amount
of indirect bankruptcy costs is hard to estimate, the existence of the scale effect is easy to be validated.
For example, as discussed in [20, 38], the time spent in bankruptcy can be used as a proxy for indirect
bankruptcy costs. Bris et al. [11] analyzed the mean time in bankruptcy with respect to the firm size,
both for Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 reorganizations (see [19] regarding the impact of Chapter
11 in comparison to Chapter 7.) They observed that larger bankruptcies take longer to resolve, but the
relative increase is small, implying the scale effect in indirect bankruptcy costs.
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FIGURE 1. (left) Bankruptcy costs and (right) percentage of bankruptcy costs with respect to the
firm value.
Due to the difficulty of estimating the exact bankruptcy costs, it is not possible to draw a general
conclusion. However, it is safe to state that the proportionality assumption of the bankruptcy costs
relative to the asset value is an oversimplification, and one needs to incorporate the scale effect for
realistic models. Furthermore, the characteristics of the bankruptcy costs vary heavily across industries,
regions and time periods, and this further motivates us to pursue more flexible formulations.
Tax benefits: As for the tax benefits, empirical evidence also suggests an effect similar to the scale
effect as in the case of bankruptcy costs. In other words, the marginal effect of taxable income reduction
per dollar is dependent on the amount of the total taxable income that changes dynamically over time.
In the original Leland model [30] and the majority of its extensions, this dependency is ignored and a
linear tax schedule, or equivalently a constant tax rate, is assumed. Because the face value and the coupon
rate are fixed constant, the rate of tax benefits also stays constant over time until bankruptcy. As is clear
from the fact that the tax exemption is not necessarily effective for example when the coupon payments
exceed the profits, this simplification overestimates the tax benefits and result in optimal leverage that
tends to be excessively higher than what is observed in reality (see, e.g., [9]).
In order to avoid this, tax cutoff is often applied. Namely, the tax rate is assumed to be a step function
that is a full corporate tax rate when the asset value (as a proxy to the taxable income value) is above a
pre-determined level and it is zero otherwise. For spatially-homogeneous processes such as Brownian
motion and Le´vy processes, this can be handled relatively easily and can potentially improve the solution
if the cutoff level is chosen appropriately. However, this is what [22] calls “an idealisation” and even a
rough estimate of these cutoff levels is hard to compute.
While the tax structure is an integral factor in determining the capital structure, the estimation of the
tax function, or the tax amount with respect to the taxable income, is already very difficult. Roughly
speaking, income is taxable but loss is not. This implies a piecewise-linear convex tax function with
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zero values on the negative part and a straight line on the positive part. However, there are many fac-
tors that deform its shape. For example, for a firm facing tax progressivity, its effective marginal tax
rate (or the derivative of its tax function) is monotonically increasing as opposed to being a constant.
Graham and Smith [21], among others, examined the effects of statutory progressivity, net operation
loss carrybacks/forwards, investment tax credits, the alternative minimum tax and uncertainty in taxable
income. After these are taken into consideration, the kink at zero of the (piecewise-linear) tax function
is smoothed out and results in another convex function that is strictly convex for small taxable income
while it gets closer to linear as the taxable income increases (see Figures 1 and 2 of [21]). This implies
that the marginal effect of taxable income reduction (or the slope of the tax function) is an increasing
function that converges to the full tax rate at infinity. The effect of this convexity in the determination
of the capital structure has been examined by, for example, [36]. It is shown in their framework that the
effects of tax convexity brings the optimal bankruptcy boundary higher and reduces the optimal leverage.
Although there are a number of papers rectifying the overestimation of the tax benefits, most of them
employ the step-function tax rate (or piecewise linear tax function) similarly to the cutoff approach
described above. However, this does not fully reflect the strict convexity for small taxable income. The
determination of tax benefits is heavily affected especially for firms with small and/or volatile taxable
income. Furthermore, the tax-code varies across countries and across industries. For these reasons, we
need a more flexible formulation of tax benefits that captures the dynamics and the tax function convexity.
In this paper, we resolve these inflexibilities of the existing models by expressing the values of bank-
ruptcy costs and tax benefits as functions of the firm’s asset value. This generalization encompasses
the existing models and adds flexibility in describing a more realistic capital structure. We focus on the
spectrally negative Le´vy model considered by [22, 27] where the firm’s asset value is driven by a general
Le´vy process with only negative jumps. We obtain a sufficient condition for optimality of a bankruptcy
strategy and show its optimality for example when, monotonically in the asset value, the value of tax
benefits is increasing, the loss amount at bankruptcy is increasing, and its proportion relative to the as-
set value is decreasing. This condition is consistent with the empirical studies reviewed above on the
bankruptcy costs and tax benefits.
Our main challenge is to obtain the endogenous bankruptcy strategy by the equity holder. While it is
fairly well-known that the continuous and/or smooth fit can be applied for the exponential Le´vy model
as in [13, 22, 27], their results rely particularly on the form of the bankruptcy cost as an exponential
function of the Le´vy process; once the function is generalized, it is no longer clear if the same principle
is directly applicable. However, thanks to the recent advances in the spectrally negative Le´vy process and
its fluctuation theories (e.g. [10, 24]), the equity value to be maximized can then be written in terms of
the scale function and, as we shall see, the optimal bankruptcy level can be derived in a general setting.
The spectrally negative Le´vy model has been drawing much attention recently in mathematical finance
and insurance as generalizations of the classical Black-Scholes and Crame´r-Lundberg models. A number
of authors have succeeded in extending the classical results to the spectrally negative Le´vy model by way
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of scale functions. We refer the reader to [5, 6] for stochastic games, [4, 7, 8, 25, 33] for the optimal
dividend problem, [1, 3] for American and Russian options, and [15, 17, 27, 32] for credit risk. In par-
ticular, Egami and Yamazaki [18] considered a general optimal stopping problem for spectrally negative
Le´vy processes and obtained the first-order condition for maximization over threshold strategies; the re-
sults are also confirmed numerically by [40] in a multiple stopping setting. Using their results, we show
under suitable assumptions that the derivative of the equity value with respect to the bankruptcy level is
monotone, and hence the optimal bankruptcy level can be obtained.
The solutions to our generalized model admit semi-explicit expressions written in terms of the scale
function, which has analytical forms in certain cases [18, 23, 26, 27] and can be approximated gener-
ally using, e.g., [16, 37]. In order to illustrate the implementation side, we give an example based on a
mixture of Brownian motion and a compound Poisson process with i.i.d. exponential jumps. We com-
pute the optimal bankruptcy levels and the corresponding equity/debt/firm values as well as the optimal
leverage ratios as solutions to the two-stage problem considered in [13, 30, 31]. We conduct a sequence
of numerical experiments to analyze the impacts of the scale effects on the bankruptcy strategy and the
capital structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing Le´vy model and
introduce our generalized model. In Section 3, we focus on the spectrally negative Le´vy model and obtain
a sufficient condition for optimality. Section 4 shows examples that satisfy the sufficient condition. We
give numerical results in Section 5. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix. Throughout the paper,
unless otherwise stated, monotonicity is understood in the weak sense; “increasing” and “decreasing”
are equivalent to “nondecreasing” and “nonincreasing”, respectively.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first review the existing model and then generalize it. In particular, we adopt the
formulation and notations by [22, 27] to a maximum extent. The formulation addressed here holds for
any Le´vy model; in the next section, we focus on the spectrally negative Le´vy process and derive optimal
solutions.
2.1. The optimal capital structure model by [22, 27]. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space
hosting a Le´vy process X = {Xt; t ≥ 0}. The value of the firm’s asset is assumed to evolve according
to an exponential Le´vy process Vt := eXt , t ≥ 0. Let r > 0 be the positive risk-free interest rate and
0 ≤ δ < r the total payout rate to the firm’s investors. We assume that the market is arbitrage-free and
that P is a risk neutral probability. This requires {e−(r−δ)tVt; t ≥ 0} to be a P-martingale. We denote by
Px the probability law and Ex the expectation under which X0 = x (or equivalently V0 = ex).
The firm is partly financed by debt with a constant debt profile; it issues new debt at a constant rate p
with maturity profile ϕ(s) := me−ms for some given constants p,m > 0. Namely, in the time interval
(t, t+ dt), it issues debt with face value pϕ(s)dtds that matures in the time interval (t+ s, t+ s+ ds).
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By this assumption, at time 0, the face value of debt that matures in (s, s+ ds) becomes[∫ 0
−∞
pϕ(s− u)du
]
ds = pe−msds,(2.1)
and the face value of all debt is a constant value,
P :=
∫ ∞
0
pe−msds =
p
m
.
Suppose the bankruptcy is triggered at the first time X goes below a given level B ∈ R, or
τ−B := inf {t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ B} , B ∈ R.(2.2)
The debt pays a constant coupon flow at a fixed rate ρˆ > 0 and a constant fraction 0 ≤ ηˆ ≤ 1 of the asset
value is lost at the bankruptcy time τ−B ; the value of the debt with a unit face value and maturity t > 0
becomes
d(x;B, t) := Ex
[ ∫ t∧τ−B
0
e−rsρˆds
]
+ Ex
[
e−rt1{t<τ−B }
]
+
1
P
Ex
[
e
−rτ−B+Xτ−
B (1− ηˆ) 1{τ−B<t}
]
.(2.3)
Here, the first term is the total value of the coupon payments accumulated until maturity or bankruptcy
whichever comes first. The second term is the value of the principle payment. The last term corresponds
to the 1/P fraction of the asset value that is distributed, in the event of bankruptcy, to the bondholder of
a unit face value. The total value of debt becomes, by (2.1) and Fubini’s theorem,
D(x;B) :=
∫ ∞
0
pe−mtd(x;B, t)dt
= Ex
[ ∫ τ−B
0
e−(r+m)t (P ρˆ+ p) dt
]
+ Ex
[
e
−(r+m)τ−B+Xτ−
B (1− ηˆ) 1{τ−B<∞}
]
.
Regarding the (market) value of the firm, it is assumed that there is a corporate tax rate γˆ ∈ [0, 1] and
its (full) rebate on coupon payments is gained if and only if Vt ≥ vT (or Xt ≥ log vT ) for some given
cutoff level vT > 0. Based on the Modigliani-Miller theorem (see, e.g., [34, 35]), the firm value becomes
V(x;B) := ex + Ex
[ ∫ τ−B
0
e−rt1{Xt≥log vT }P γˆρˆdt
]
− ηˆEx
[
e
−rτ−B+Xτ−
B 1{τ−B<∞}
]
,
where each term corresponds to the current (unlevered) asset value, the total value of tax benefits and the
value of loss at bankruptcy, respectively.
The problem is to pursue an optimal bankruptcy level B ∈ R that maximizes the equity value,
E(x;B) := V(x;B)−D(x;B), x > B,(2.4)
subject to the limited liability constraint,
E(x;B) ≥ 0, x ≥ B,(2.5)
if such a level exists. This Le´vy model was first solved by Hilberink and Rogers [22] for a special class
of Le´vy processes taking the form of an independent sum of a linear Brownian motion and a compound
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Poisson process with negative jumps (cf. (3.21) on page 245 of [22]). Kyprianou and Surya [27] later
showed for a general spectrally negative process that the optimal bankruptcy level exists and is explicitly
determined by applying continuous and smooth fit when X is of bounded and unbounded variation,
respectively. Regarding the cases with both positive and negative jumps, Chen and Kou [13] and Dao
and Jeanblanc [14] solved for double exponential jump diffusion and Le Courtois and Quittard-Pinon
[29] solved for stable processes.
2.2. Our generalization. We now incorporate scale effects and generalize the model described above
by allowing the loss fraction ηˆ and tax rebate rate γˆ dependent on X .
First, we generalize the debt value (2.3) to
d(x;B, t) := Ex
[ ∫ t∧τ−B
0
e−rsρˆds
]
+ Ex
[
e−rt1{t<τ−B }
]
+
1
P
Ex
[
e
−rτ−B+Xτ−
B
(
1− η(Xτ−B )) 1{τ−B<t}]
where η(·) ≥ 0 is the rate of loss at bankruptcy. The total debt value becomes
D(x;B) := Ex
[ ∫ τ−B
0
e−(r+m)t (P ρˆ+ p) dt
]
+ Ex
[
e
−(r+m)τ−B+Xτ−
B
(
1− η(Xτ−B )) 1{τ−B<∞}].
By setting
η(y) := eyη(y), y ∈ R,
we can write
(2.6) D(x;B) = Ex
[ ∫ τ−B
0
e−(r+m)t (P ρˆ+ p) dt
]
+ Ex
[
e
−(r+m)τ−B+Xτ−
B 1{τ−B<∞}
]
− Ex
[
e−(r+m)τ
−
B η
(
Xτ−B
)
1{τ−B<∞}
]
.
Here notice that η(·) denotes the total loss amount whereas η(·) is the rate of loss relative to the asset
value. We allow η to be larger than 1, which lets one to model, for example, the case η is a constant; see
Section 4.3 below.
We next generalize the tax rebates; the firm value with bankruptcy level B is
V(x;B) := ex + Ex
[ ∫ τ−B
0
e−rtf(Xt)dt
]
− Ex
[
e−rτ
−
B η
(
Xτ−B
)
1{τ−B<∞}
]
,(2.7)
where f(·) ∈ [0, P ρˆ] is the rate of tax rebates. As we discuss in Remark 3.1(1) below, under Assump-
tion 3.2, each expectation in (2.6)-(2.7) is finite for all x > B and hence the equity value, E(x;B) =
V(x;B)−D(x;B), is well-defined.
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3. SOLUTIONS FOR THE SPECTRALLY NEGATIVE LE´VY MODELS
In this section, we study the problem (2.4)-(2.5) with the debt and firm values generalized to (2.6)-
(2.7) focusing on the case X is a spectrally negative Le´vy process, or a Le´vy process with only negative
jumps. We assume that X is uniquely defined by the Laplace exponent,
κ(s) := logE0
[
esX1
]
= cs+
1
2
σ2s2 +
∫
(0,∞)
(e−sx − 1 + sx1{0<x<1}) Π(dx), s ≥ 0,(3.1)
where c ∈ R, σ ≥ 0, and Π is a measure on (0,∞) such that ∫
(0,∞)(1 ∧ x2)Π(dx) < ∞. We ignore the
case X is the negative of a subordinator (monotonically decreasing a.s.).
The process X has paths of bounded variation if and only if σ = 0 and
∫
(0,∞)(1 ∧ x)Π(dx) <∞. For
more details about the spectrally negative Le´vy process, we refer the reader to, e.g., [10, 24].
3.1. Scale functions. For our derivation of optimal solutions, we first rewrite (2.6)-(2.7) using the scale
function. For a given spectrally negative Le´vy process with Laplace exponent κ, there exists an increasing
function
W (q) : R→ [0,∞), q ≥ 0,
such that W (q)(x) = 0 for all x < 0 and∫ ∞
0
e−sxW (q)(x)dx =
1
κ(s)− q , s > Φ(q)
where
Φ(q) := sup {s > 0 : κ(s) = q} , q ≥ 0.
Here Φ(q) is strictly increasing in q because κ is zero at the origin and strictly convex on [0,∞).
If τ+a is the first time the process goes above a > x > 0 and τ
−
0 is the first time it goes below zero as a
special case of (2.2), then we have
Ex
[
e−qτ
+
a 1{τ+a <τ−0 , τ+a <∞}
]
=
W (q)(x)
W (q)(a)
and Ex
[
e−qτ
−
0 1{τ+a >τ−0 , τ−0 <∞}
]
= Z(q)(x)− Z(q)(a)W
(q)(x)
W (q)(a)
,
where
Z(q)(x) := 1 + qW
(q)
(x) with W
(q)
(x) :=
∫ x
0
W (q)(y)dy, x ∈ R.
In particular, W (q) is continuously differentiable on (0,∞) if Π does not have atoms (see [28]), and it
is twice-differentiable on (0,∞) if σ > 0 (see [12]). For the rest of this paper, we assume the former.
Assumption 3.1. We assume that Π does not have atoms.
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Fix q > 0. The scale function increases exponentially;
W (q)(x) ∼ e
Φ(q)x
κ′(Φ(q))
as x→∞.(3.2)
As in Lemmas 4.3-4.4 of [27], for all q > 0,
W (q)(0) =
{
0, if X is of unbounded variation
1
µ
, if X is of bounded variation
}
,
W (q)
′
(0+) =

2
σ2
, if σ > 0
∞, if σ = 0 and Π(0,∞) =∞
q+Π(0,∞)
µ2
, otherwise
 ,
(3.3)
where µ := c+
∫
(0,1)
xΠ(dx) that is finite for the case X is of bounded variation.
3.2. In terms of the scale function. We now rewrite (2.6)-(2.7) using the scale function. Toward this
end, we introduce the following shorthand notations:
Λ(q)(x;B) := Ex
[
e−qτ
−
B η(Xτ−B
)1{τ−B<∞}
]
,
M(q)(x;B) := Ex
[ ∫ τ−B
0
e−qtf(Xt)dt
]
and N (q)(x;B) := Ex
[ ∫ τ−B
0
e−qt (P ρˆ+ p) dt
]
,
for any q > 0 and x > B. These functions admit semi-explicit expressions in terms of the scale function.
By Lemmas 2.1-2.3 of Egami and Yamazaki [18], for all x > B and q > 0, we can write
Λ(q)(x;B) = η(B)
[
Z(q)(x−B)− q
Φ(q)
W (q)(x−B)
]
−W (q)(x−B)H(q)(B)
+
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
∫ u∧(x−B)
0
W (q)(x− z −B)[η(B)− η(z +B − u)]dz,
M(q)(x;B) = W (q)(x−B)G(q)(B)−
∫ x
B
W (q)(x− y)f(y)dy,
N (q)(x;B) = (P ρˆ+ p)
( 1
Φ(q)
W (q)(x−B)−W (q)(x−B)
)
,
(3.4)
where
H(q)(B) :=
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
∫ u
0
e−Φ(q)z[η(B)− η(B − u+ z)]dz,
G(q)(B) :=
∫ ∞
0
e−Φ(q)yf(y +B)dy.
On the other hand, by Lemma 4.7 of [27], we have Ey
[
e
−qτ−0 +Xτ−0 1{τ−0 <∞}
]
= ey − Γ(q)(y) where
Γ(q)(y) :=
κ(1)− q
1− Φ(q)W
(q)(y) + (κ(1)− q)ey
∫ y
0
e−zW (q)(z)dz, q > 0 and y > 0.(3.5)
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Hence, for any x > B,
Ex
[
e
−(r+m)τ−B+Xτ−
B 1{τ−B<∞}
]
= eBEx−B
[
e
−(r+m)τ−0 +Xτ−0 1{τ−0 <∞}
]
= ex − eBΓ(r+m)(x−B).
Putting altogether, for all x > B, we simplify (2.6)-(2.7) to
D(x;B) = ex − eBΓ(r+m)(x−B) +N (r+m)(x;B)− Λ(r+m)(x;B),
V(x;B) = ex +M(r)(x;B)− Λ(r)(x;B),
and we obtain the equity value
E(x;B) = eBΓ(r+m)(x−B) + (M(r)(x;B)− Λ(r)(x;B))− (N (r+m)(x;B)− Λ(r+m)(x;B)).(3.6)
In view of (3.4), because f is bounded,M(r)(x;B) is finite for all x > B. Regarding η, we assume
the following for the rest of this section.
Assumption 3.2. We assume that η is C2(R) and is bounded on (−∞,M ] for any fixed M ∈ R.
Here the C2-assumption is imposed for simplicity of the arguments; this can be relaxed as discussed
in Remark 3.5 below.
Remark 3.1. (1) By Assumption 3.2, the equity value E(x;B) is well-defined for any x > B.
(2) Because η is continuous, Λ(q)(x;B),N (q)(x;B) andM(q)(x;B) are continuous inB on (−∞, x]
for any fixed x ∈ R.
3.3. Derivative with respect toB. To derive the candidate bankruptcy level, we use the results in Egami
and Yamazaki [18] and obtain the derivative of E(x;B) with respect to B. Define
Θ(q)(x) := W (q)
′
(x)− Φ(q)W (q)(x), x > 0 and q > 0,(3.7)
which is known to be always positive. Given the descending ladder process {(L̂−1t , Ĥt) : t ≥ 0} (see
Section 6.2 of [24]) and the dirac measure δ0 at 0, we have
∫∞
0
E0
[
e−qL̂
−1
t 1{Ĥt∈dx}
]
dt = Θ(q)(x)dx +
W (q)(0)δ0(dx), which can be confirmed by taking its Laplace transform and the Wiener-Hopf factoriza-
tion. In view of this, Θ(q)(x) is monotonically decreasing in q for every fixed x > 0.
The derivatives of Λ(q)(x;B),M(q)(x;B) and N (q)(x;B) with respect to B require technical details.
However, as shown by [18], each term can be expressed as a product of Θ(q)(x− B) and some function
of B (that is independent of x). For the proof of the following, see the proof of Proposition 3.1 of [18].
Lemma 3.1. For every x > B and q > 0, we have
∂
∂B
Λ(q)(x;B) = Θ(q)(x−B)
[ q
Φ(q)
η(B) +H(q)(B) +
σ2
2
η′(B)
]
,
∂
∂B
M(q)(x;B) = −Θ(q)(x−B)G(q)(B), and ∂
∂B
N (q)(x;B) = −Θ(q)(x−B) P ρˆ+ p
Φ(r +m)
.
For the derivative of (3.6) with respect to B, we further obtain the following.
OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH SCALE EFFECTS 11
Lemma 3.2. For every x > B, ∂(eBΓ(r+m)(x−B))/∂B = −κ(1)−(r+m)
1−Φ(r+m) e
BΘ(r+m)(x−B).
By combining the two lemmas above, we obtain the derivative of E(x;B) with respect to B. For all
B ∈ R, define
J (r,m)(B) :=
( r +m
Φ(r +m)
− r
Φ(r)
)
η(B)− (H(r)(B)−H(r+m)(B))(3.8)
and
K
(r,m)
1 (B) :=
κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) e
B − P ρˆ+ p
Φ(r +m)
+G(r)(B)− J (r,m)(B),
K
(r)
2 (B) := G
(r)(B) +
r
Φ(r)
η(B) +H(r)(B) +
σ2
2
η′(B).
(3.9)
Proposition 3.1. For every x > B,
∂
∂B
E(x;B) = −[Θ(r+m)(x−B)K(r,m)1 (B) + {Θ(r)(x−B)−Θ(r+m)(x−B)}K(r)2 (B)].(3.10)
Remark 3.2. If η(B) is increasing in B, then K(r)2 is uniformly positive.
The following remark will be especially useful in our analysis; the proof is given in the Appendix.
Remark 3.3. We can also write
J (r,m)(B) =
1
2
σ2(Φ(r +m)− Φ(r))η(B) +
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
∫ u
0
(e−Φ(r)z − e−Φ(r+m)z)η(B − u+ z)dz.
Consequently, because Φ(q) is increasing in q and η(·) is positive by assumption, J (r+m)(B) ≥ 0 for all
B ∈ R.
3.4. Continuous fit. Before discussing the optimality, we consider the continuous fit condition:
E(B+;B) = 0.
By taking x ↓ 0 in (3.6),
E(B+;B) = eBΓ(r+m)(0) + (M(r)(B+;B)− Λ(r)(B+;B))− (N (r+m)(B+;B)− Λ(r+m)(B+;B)).
(3.11)
Here we have, by (3.5), Γ(r+m)(0) = κ(1)−(r+m)
1−Φ(r+m) W
(r+m)(0), and by Proposition 3.2 of [18], for both
q = r and q = r +m,
Λ(q)(B+;B) = −W (q)(0)
( q
Φ(q)
η(B) +H(q)(B)
)
+ η(B),
M(q)(B+;B) = W (q)(0)G(q)(B) and N (q)(B+;B) = W (q)(0) P ρˆ+ p
Φ(r +m)
.
(3.12)
Substituting (3.12) in (3.11) and because W (r)(0) = W (r+m)(0) as in (3.3), we obtain
E(B+;B) = W (r+m)(0)K(r,m)1 (B).(3.13)
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By (3.3), we conclude that for the bounded variation case the continuous fit condition is equivalent to
K
(r,m)
1 (B) = 0, while for the unbounded variation case it always holds no matter how B is chosen.
Remark 3.4. One can further pursue smooth fit for the case X is of unbounded variation. However, we
do not discuss it here because it is not necessary for the proof of optimality in the subsequent sections.
In fact, it is expected that the smooth fit condition E ′(B+;B) = 0 is equivalent to K(r,m)1 (B) = 0, and
the optimal solution is expected to satisfy smooth fit (at least when σ > 0 by the results obtained in [18]).
Our numerical results in Section 5 verifies that this is indeed so.
3.5. Optimality. We assume that there exists B∗ ∈ [−∞,∞] such that
K
(r,m)
1 (B) ≥ 0⇐⇒ B ≥ B∗,(3.14)
K
(r)
2 (B) ≥ 0, B ≥ B∗,(3.15)
and prove its optimality. Note that, if B∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), then we must have K(r,m)1 (B∗) = 0. When the
function K(r,m)1 stays constant on some interval, then the solution to K
(r,m)
1 (B) = 0 may not be unique;
in such cases, in view of (3.14), it is understood that the smallest element is chosen for B∗. We later
discuss sufficient conditions that guarantee (3.14)-(3.15). Notice here that (3.15) always holds given that
η(B) is increasing in view of Remark 3.2.
We first show via continuous fit and (3.14)-(3.15) that any feasible bankruptcy level must be at least
as large as B∗. Toward this end, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. When X is of unbounded variation, we have Θ(r)(y)−Θ(r+m)(y)→ 0 as y ↓ 0.
Lemma 3.4. If B∗ ∈ [−∞,∞] satisfies (3.14) and B satisfies (2.5), then B ∈ [B∗,∞).
If B∗ = ∞, then it is the only choice that satisfies the limited liability constraint and hence B∗ = ∞
is trivially optimal. Suppose B∗ ∈ [−∞,∞). By how B∗ is chosen, (3.14)-(3.15) and the positivity of
both Θ(r)(y)−Θ(r+m)(y) and Θ(r)(y) for any y > 0, Proposition 3.1 implies
∂E(x;B)/∂B ≤ 0, B∗ < B < x.(3.16)
Moreover, B∗ satisfies the limited liability constraint (2.5). Indeed, when B∗ = −∞, it is trivially
satisfied; when B∗ > −∞, for any arbitrary x > B∗, we have by (3.13) that 0 ≤ W (r+m)(0)K(r,m)1 (x) =
E(x+;x) ≤ E(x;B∗). Here the first inequality holds because K(r,m)1 (x) ≥ 0 for any x > B∗ by (3.14)
and in particular it holds by equality for the unbounded variation case; the last inequality holds by (3.16).
This together with the lemma above shows the optimality of B∗. In summary, we have the following.
Theorem 3.1. If there exists B∗ ∈ [−∞,∞] such that (3.14)-(3.15) hold, then B∗ is the optimal bank-
ruptcy level.
Remark 3.5. The assumption that η is twice-differentiable on R as in Assumption 3.2 can be relaxed.
Its twice-differentiability at a fixed B ∈ R is required for Lemma 3.1. In view of the arguments in this
section (and in particular Remark 3.1-(2)), we only need it to be piecewise C2 as long as it is continuous.
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Remark 3.6. The case B∗ = −∞ corresponds to the case it is never optimal to go bankrupt. The
corresponding equity value becomes E(x;−∞) := limB↓−∞ E(x;B), which exists thanks to (3.16). In
fact, by Assumption 3.2, the bankruptcy cost vanishes as B ↓ −∞ and because τ−B
B↓−∞−−−−→ ∞ a.s.,
dominated and monotone convergence yields
E(x;−∞) = ex + Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xt)dt
]
− P ρˆ+ p
r +m
,
where the middle term can be written in terms of the scale function as in Corollary 8.9 of [24].
4. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In the last section, we showed that the conditions (3.14)-(3.15) guarantee the optimality of the bank-
ruptcy level B∗. Here we obtain more concrete and economically sound conditions that satisfy (3.14)-
(3.15). We first show that Assumption 4.1 below is sufficient and also encompasses the model by [22, 27]
as reviewed in Section 2.1. We then give another example with a constant η that does not satisfy Assump-
tion 4.1 but nonetheless guarantees the optimality. It is emphasized here that the assumptions discussed
in this section are sufficient and clearly not necessary; (3.14)-(3.15) are expected to hold more generally.
4.1. A sufficient condition. We show that the following assumption guarantees (3.14)-(3.15) and hence
the optimality of B∗ holds by Theorem 3.1.
Assumption 4.1. (1) η is increasing, (2) η is decreasing, (3) f is increasing, and (4) 0 ≤ η(·) ≤ 1.
Each condition in the assumption is justified by the empirical studies as we described in Section 1.
The monotonicity of η and η in (1) and (2) means that, as the firm’s asset value increases, the amount of
total bankruptcy costs increases and its proportion relative to the asset value decreases. This is exactly
the same as the results on scale effects derived by [2, 11, 39]; see Section 1 and in particular Figure 1.
The monotonicity of f (or the tax rebate rate) in (3) is implied by the convexity of the tax function that
has been empirically confirmed by [21]; the marginal effect of taxable income reduction (or the slope of
the tax function) is an increasing function that converges to the full tax rate at infinity. The last condition
(4) requires that the bankruptcy costs should not be more than the total asset value.
We first note that (1) guarantees (3.15) by Remark 3.2. The following proposition shows thatK(r,m)1 (B)
is monotonically increasing and hence (3.14) also holds.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds. Then (i) there exists B∗ ∈ [−∞,∞) such that (3.14)-
(3.15) hold, and (ii) it is an optimal bankruptcy level.
In order to prove Proposition 4.1, we first rewrite, in view of (3.9) and Remark 3.3,
K
(r,m)
1 (B) = e
Bl(B)− P ρˆ+ p
Φ(r +m)
+G(r)(B)
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where
(4.1) l(B) :=
κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) −
1
2
σ2(Φ(r +m)− Φ(r))η(B)
−
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
∫ u
0
(e−Φ(r)z − e−Φ(r+m)z)ez−uη(B − u+ z)dz.
Because η(B) is decreasing inB by assumption and Φ(q) is increasing in q, we have that l(B) is increas-
ing. Because η(B) is monotone and bounded in [0, 1], there exists η(−∞) := limB↓−∞ η(B) ∈ [0, 1].
By the monotone convergence theorem, we obtain
lim
B↓−∞
l(B) =
κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) −
1
2
σ2(Φ(r +m)− Φ(r))η(−∞)
−
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
∫ u
0
(e−Φ(r)z − e−Φ(r+m)z)ez−uη(−∞)dz = κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) − η(−∞)j
(r,m)
where
j(r,m) :=
1
2
σ2(Φ(r +m)− Φ(r)) +
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)e−u
(1− e−(Φ(r)−1)u
Φ(r)− 1 −
1− e−(Φ(r+m)−1)u
Φ(r +m)− 1
)
.
Lemma 4.1. We have j(r,m) = κ(1)−(r+m)
1−Φ(r+m) − κ(1)−r1−Φ(r) .
Now by Lemma 4.1, limB↓−∞ l(B) = (1 − η(−∞))κ(1)−(r+m)1−Φ(r+m) + η(−∞) κ(1)−r1−Φ(r) . Because 0 ≤
η(−∞) ≤ 1 and κ is convex on [0,∞) and zero at the origin, we have limB↓−∞ l(B) > 0 and hence
l(B) > 0 for any B ∈ R. Consequently, eBl(B) is strictly increasing in B. Finally, − P ρˆ+p
Φ(r+m)
+G(r)(B)
is increasing in B because f is increasing by assumption. Therefore, there exists a unique B∗ that sat-
isfies (3.14). Here K(r,m)1 (B)
B↑∞−−−→ ∞, and hence B∗ < ∞. As is discussed above, (3.15) holds by the
monotonicity of η. Now, by Theorem 3.1, Proposition 4.1 holds.
Remark 4.1. If G(r)(B) B↓−∞−−−−→ 0 (which holds when the tax rebate function f(x) vanishes as x ↓ −∞
by dominated convergence), then K(r,m)1 (B)
B↓−∞−−−−→ −(P ρˆ+ p)/Φ(r +m) < 0 and hence B∗ > −∞.
4.2. Reduction to the case by [22, 27]. As an example that satisfies Assumption 4.1, we revisit the
simple case by [22, 27] as reviewed in Section 2.1. Namely, we set
f(x) = 1{x≥log vT }P γˆρˆ, and η(B) = ηˆ,
and confirm that our results match those of [22, 27].
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First, Assumption 4.1 is trivially satisfied and hence the optimal threshold level B∗ is uniquely given
by K(r,m)1 (B
∗) = 0 (here B∗ > −∞ because f(x) ↓ 0 as x ↓ −∞ by Remark 4.1). In this case,
G(r)(B) =
∫ ∞
0
e−Φ(r)yf(y +B)dy = P γˆρˆ
∫ ∞
(log vT−B)∨0
e−Φ(r)ydy =
P γˆρˆ
Φ(r)
e−Φ(r)((log vT−B)∨0)
=
P γˆρˆ
Φ(r)
(
elog vT−B ∨ 1)−Φ(r) = P γˆρˆ
Φ(r)
(
(e−BvT ) ∨ 1
)−Φ(r)
=
P γˆρˆ
Φ(r)
(eB
vT
∧ 1
)Φ(r)
.
We also have, by Remark 3.3 and Lemma 4.1,
J (r,m)(B) =
1
2
σ2(Φ(r +m)− Φ(r))eB ηˆ +
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
∫ u
0
(e−Φ(r)z − e−Φ(r+m)z)eB−u+zηˆdz
= j(r,m)ηˆeB =
(κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) −
κ(1)− r
1− Φ(r)
)
ηˆeB.
Combining the above,
K
(r,m)
1 (B) =
κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) e
B − P (ρˆ+m)
Φ(r +m)
+
P γˆρˆ
Φ(r)
(eB
vT
∧ 1
)Φ(r)
− ηˆeB
(κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) −
κ(1)− r
1− Φ(r)
)
= −P (ρˆ+m)
Φ(r +m)
+
P γˆρˆ
Φ(r)
(eB
vT
∧ 1
)Φ(r)
+ eB
(
(1− ηˆ)κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) + ηˆ
κ(1)− r
1− Φ(r)
)
.
The unique value of B∗ that satisfies K(r,m)1 (B
∗) = 0 indeed matches the result of [22, 27].
4.3. Other examples. Although Assumption 4.1 is already a reasonable assumption, it is expected that
(3.14)-(3.15) hold more generally. As an example where Assumption 4.1 is violated but the optimality of
B∗ holds, we consider the case the value of bankruptcy costs is a constant, i.e., η ≡ η0; see [30]. In this
case, we have η(y) = η0e−y, which violates Assumption 4.1-(4). Nonetheless, the optimality trivially
holds upon the monotonicity of G(r). Indeed, H(r) ≡ H(r+m) ≡ 0 and hence, by (3.8), J (r,m)(B) =(
r+m
Φ(r+m)
− r
Φ(r)
)
η0, which is a constant. Now in view of the definition of K
(r+m)
1 in (3.9), it is clearly
increasing in B for example when Assumption 4.1-(3) holds, and hence (3.14) is valid. Moreover, (3.15)
trivially holds by Remark 3.2.
5. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section, we conduct a series of numerical experiments using the results obtained in the previous
sections. Here we focus on analyzing the impacts of scale effects on the capital structure because this
is the main theme of this paper. For other numerical experiments such as the impacts of the Le´vy
measure and term structure, we refer the reader to a comprehensive study conducted by [13, 14]. We first
illustrate how to compute the optimal bankruptcy level, the associated equity/debt/firm values as well as
the optimal face value as a solution to the two-stage problem [13, 30, 31]. We then study computationally
the impacts of the scale effects on these values. We use an example where Assumption 4.1 holds and, for
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X , we follow [22] and use a mixture of a Brownian motion and a compound Poisson process with i.i.d.
exponential jumps.
For the bankruptcy costs, let
η(x) = η0
(
1 ∧ e−a(x−b)) , x ∈ R,(5.1)
for some 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, b ∈ R and 0 ≤ η0 ≤ 1. This is clearly decreasing in x and bounded in [0, 1].
Moreover, η(x) = η0
(
ex ∧ e(1−a)x+ab) is increasing. We call a the degree of bankruptcy cost concavity.
When a = 0, the scale effect vanishes and the ratio η becomes a constant. However, as a gets larger, the
concavity of the function η increases. When a = 1, η(x) = η0ex∧b and is constant uniformly on [b,∞).
Clearly, the bankruptcy cost is monotonically decreasing in a.
For the tax benefits, let
f(x) = P γˆρˆ
(
ex−c ∧ 1)(5.2)
for some c ∈ R. While it is rather an oversimplification, this efficiently models the effective tax function,
empirically obtained by [21], which is strictly convex for small taxable income but is closer to linear
for large taxable income. Indeed, (5.2) is increasing on (−∞, c) and is constant on [c,∞), making its
antiderivative a desired convex function. We call c the degree of tax convexity. The value of tax benefits
decreases monotonically as c increases.
Our choice of (5.1)-(5.2) satisfy all the conditions in Assumption 4.1 and hence Proposition 4.1 holds.
Regarding X , we consider the exponential diffusion in the form Xt = µt+ σBt − Jt, t ≥ 0, where B
is a standard Brownian motion and J is a pure-jump Le´vy process with its Le´vy measure
Π(du) = λβe−βudu, u > 0.(5.3)
Its Laplace exponent (3.1) is given by κ(s) = µs + 1
2
σ2s2 + λ
(
β
β+s
− 1), s ∈ R. The scale function
of this process has an explicit expression written in terms of a sum of exponential functions. For every
q > 0, there are two negative real roots −ξ1,q and −ξ2,q to the equation κ(s) = q and, as is discussed in
[16], its scale function is given by
W (q)(x) = −
∑
i=1,2
1
κ′(−ξi,q)
[
eΦ(q)x − e−ξi,qx] , x ≥ 0.(5.4)
By straightforward but tedious algebra, we can obtain each functional in the equity value (3.6) as well
as the function K(r,m)1 in (3.9) that determines the optimal bankruptcy level.
We first illustrate how to compute the optimal bankruptcy level, firm/equity/debt values and the opti-
mal capital structure. We use r = 7.5%, δ = 7%, γˆ = 35%, σ = 0.2, λ = 0.5 and β = 9 which were
used in [22, 27, 30, 31]. We also use ρˆ = 8.162% and m = 0.2, which were used in [13]. We choose the
drift term µ so that the martingale property κ(1) = r− δ is satisfied. Regarding the parameters for η and
f defined above, we consider the following two cases:
case 1: η0 = 0.9, a = 0.5, b = 0 and c = 5,
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FIGURE 2. The plots of K(r,m)1 (B).
case 2: η0 = 0.5, a = 0.01, b = 5 and c = 0.
In case 1, the slopes of η and f are magnified by how the parameters are chosen. On the other hand, in
case 2, these values are constant at least when x ∈ [0, 5], making the model similar to [22, 27].
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FIGURE 3. The equity values as a function of V0 for various values of B.
Figure 2 shows the function K(r+m)1 in (3.9) as a function of B when P = 50. As shown in the proof
of Proposition 4.1, this is indeed monotonically increasing for both cases. The optimal bankruptcy level
B∗ can therefore be computed by the bisection method and we obtain B∗ = 3.61 and B∗ = 3.64 for
cases 1 and 2, respectively. In case 2, we notice a non-smooth point at zero and this is caused because
c = 0 in the definition of f in (5.2). However, because B∗ is chosen larger than zero, the tax rate
becomes constant until bankruptcy. Furthermore, because B∗ < b, the loss fraction η at bankruptcy
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FIGURE 4. The firm value as a function of P for the two-stage problem.
ends up being a constant. In case 1, on the other hand, the tax rate fluctuates over time and η is also
asset-value-dependent.
Using the optimal bankruptcy levels B∗ computed above, we can compute the equity values. In Figure
3, we plot their values as a function of the asset value V0 = ex ≥ eB forB = B∗−0.2, B∗−0.1, B∗, B∗+
0.1, B∗ + 0.2. As shown in Lemma 3.4, we can confirm that, when B is taken lower than B∗, it violates
the limited liability constraint (2.5). For B larger than B∗, the equity value is dominated by the value
under B∗. We note that continuous fit at B always holds as in (3.13). Also, as we have discussed in
Remark 3.4, we also observe that smooth fit holds at B∗.
For the optimal capital structure, we solve the two-stage problem as studied by [13, 30, 31] where the
final goal is to choose P (withm and x fixed constant) such that the firm’s value V is maximized, namely,
max
P
V(x;B∗(P ), P )(5.5)
where we emphasize the dependency of V and B∗ on P . As discussed in [13], this is only a rough
approximation of the optimal capital structure/bankruptcy strategy and does not fully capture the conflict
of interest between debt holders and equity holders. However, this is commonly used, and one major
advantage of using this formulation is that (5.5) typically admits a global optimum P ∗. In particular,
the concavity of V(x;B∗(P ), P ) with respect to P has been analytically shown by [13] for the double
exponential jump diffusion case in their setting. In our case with a generalized bankruptcy cost and tax
rate functions, the proof of concavity is significantly difficult. However, from our numerical results given
below, it seems to hold at least with our specifications (5.1)-(5.2); see Figure 4 below.
We set V0 = 100 (or x = log(100)) and obtain B∗ for P running from 0 to 100. The corresponding
firm value V is computed for each P and B∗ = B∗(P ), and is shown in Figure 4. As can be seen, these
are indeed concave and hence the optimal face values of debt P ∗ = 73.7 and P ∗ = 39 are obtained for
cases 1 and 2, respectively.
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5.1. Numerical results on the scale effects. We are now ready to study the impacts of scale effects on
the optimal bankruptcy levels, equity/debt/firm values as well as the optimal capital structure. We use
the degree of bankruptcy cost concavity a and tax convexity c in (5.1)-(5.2) as proxies for scale effects
and study how these values change with a and c. The parameters for (5.1)-(5.2) are the same as case 1
above, unless specified otherwise. We set V0 = 100, and in particular, for Figures 5 and 6, P = 50.
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FIGURE 5. Effects of bankruptcy cost concavity a for fixed face value P = 50.
Figure 5 shows the impacts of the bankruptcy cost concavity. All the figures are with respect to a
running from 0 to 1. Recalling that the bankruptcy cost is decreasing in a, most of the results are rela-
tively straightforward. As can be observed in (i)-(iii), each of the firm/equity/debt values is increasing.
From (iv), we see that the bankruptcy level B∗ is decreasing. This is because, as the bankruptcy cost de-
creases (or a increases), the bankruptcy level can be lowered further without violating the limited liability
constraint. Notice that all the figures here exhibit not only monotonicity but also concavity/convexity.
Figure 6 shows the impacts of the tax convexity. All the figures are with respect to c running from 3
to 8. Because it reduces the tax benefits monotonically, the results here are essentially opposite of those
in Figure 5. Each of the firm/equity/debt values is decreasing. The value of B∗ is increasing because
it must be raised so as not to violate the limited liability constraint. Contrary to Figure 5, these figures
no longer exhibit concavity nor convexity. This is due to the shape of the tax rate function (5.2), which
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FIGURE 6. Effects of tax convexity c for fixed face value P = 50.
converges to zero as c gets smaller and to the maximum tax benefit rate P γˆρˆ as it gets larger. This means
that the marginal effect of changing the value of c vanishes as c gets sufficiently large or sufficiently
small. In particular, for c smaller than the bankruptcy level B∗, because f(x) is constant uniformly on
[c,∞), changing the value of c does not have any effect because f(Xt) remains constant at any time
before bankruptcy. This results in a flat line on each figure for small c.
We now move on to studying the impacts of the scale effects on the optimal capital structure. We
consider the two-stage problem (5.5) and let the face value P be a control variable.
Figure 7 shows the impacts of the bankruptcy cost concavity on the optimal capital structure. For
each value of a ranging from 0 to 1, we solve the two-stage problem (5.5) and compute (i) the optimal
face value P ∗(a) as well as (ii) bankruptcy level, and (iii)-(v) firm/equity/debt values corresponding to
(a, P ∗(a)). From (i), we see that P ∗(a) is increasing. This is because, as the bankruptcy cost decreases,
the firm tends to rely more on debt financing so as to enjoy more tax benefits. While the problem is com-
plicated due to the (conflicting) inner optimization where the equity holder chooses the bankruptcy level
to maximize the equity value, it turns out that the (firm) value of the two-stage problem is monotonically
decreasing in a as seen in (iii). It can be confirmed that by choosing optimally the face value P ∗, the firm
value is necessarily no less than the unlevered asset value V0 = 100 (which is attained by setting P = 0).
Notice that this is not always true when the face value is fixed as in Figure 5-(i). The results in Figure 7
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FIGURE 7. Effects of bankruptcy cost concavity in the two-stage problem.
are different from those in Figure 5 because the face value also changes as a changes. Nonetheless, we
still observe monotonicity and convexity/concavity in these figures.
Figure 8 shows the impacts of tax convexity. Similarly to Figure 7, for each value of c ranging from 3 to
8, we compute the optimal face value P ∗(c) and the values corresponding to (c, P ∗(c)). Interestingly, the
optimal face value P ∗(c) fails to be monotone and, for this reason, the bankruptcy level and equity/debt
values also fail to be monotone. Nevertheless, the firm value, or the value of the two-stage problem, is
still monotonically decreasing. The non-monotonicity of P ∗(c) is caused due to the nature of the tax
benefits. As in the case of Figure 6, the marginal effect of changing c is negligible when c is sufficiently
large or sufficiently small. For a medium value of c, we observe the monotonicity, which is consistent
with the intuition that the tax convexity decreases the tax benefits and hence also the leverage. However,
for a neighborhood of c where the marginal effect is very small but not exactly zero, non-monotonicity
of the optimal face value can happen due to the two conflicting maximizations of the equity value and
the firm value. Also recall that the tax benefits vanish as c increases. We can confirm that, as c increases,
the optimal face value P ∗(c) converges to zero, thereby making the debt worthless, and the firm value
converges to the unlevered asset value V0 = 100.
In summary, scale effects have significant impacts on the capital structure. Depending on the choice of
bankruptcy cost and tax rate functions, the results can also become very complicated. The computation
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FIGURE 8. Effects of tax convexity in the two-stage problem.
we conducted here is efficient and does not rely on heavy algorithms. This is partly due to the form of
its scale function (5.4) and also to the choice of η and f given above. However, this can be extended
very easily to the phase-type case; see [16]. For other spectrally negative Le´vy processes with explicit
forms of scale functions, see [23, 26, 27]. We also remark that the solutions can in principle be computed
numerically for any choice of spectrally negative Le´vy process by using the approximation algorithms
of the scale function such as [16, 37].
APPENDIX A. PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 3.2. By (3.5) and (3.7), the left-hand side equals
eB(Γ(r+m)(x−B)− Γ(r+m)′(x−B)) = −eB
[
κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) W
(r+m)′(x−B)
+(κ(1)− (r +m))W (r+m)(x−B)− κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) W
(r+m)(x−B)
]
,
which equals the right-hand side. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. Applying Lemmas 3.1-3.2 in (3.6),
∂
∂B
E(x;B) =−Θ(r+m)(x−B)κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) e
B
+ Θ(r+m)(x−B)
[ P ρˆ+ p
Φ(r +m)
+
r +m
Φ(r +m)
η(B) +H(r+m)(B) +
σ2
2
η′(B)
]
−Θ(r)(x−B)
[
G(r)(B) +
r
Φ(r)
η(B) +H(r)(B) +
σ2
2
η′(B)
]
.
The claim holds by replacing the last term with
−Θ(r+m)(x−B)
[
G(r)(B) +
r
Φ(r)
η(B) +H(r)(B) +
σ2
2
η′(B)
]
− (Θ(r)(x−B)−Θ(r+m)(x−B))
[
G(r)(B) +
r
Φ(r)
η(B) +H(r)(B) +
σ2
2
η′(B)
]
.

Proof of Remark 3.3. Because, for any q > 0, q
Φ(q)
= c+ 1
2
σ2Φ(q)+
∫
(0,∞) Π(du)
(
e−Φ(q)u−1
Φ(q)
+u1{u∈(0,1)}
)
,
r +m
Φ(r +m)
− r
Φ(r)
=
1
2
σ2 (Φ(r +m)− Φ(r))−
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
(
e−Φ(r)u − 1
Φ(r)
+ u1{u∈(0,1)}
)
+
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
(
e−Φ(r+m)u − 1
Φ(r +m)
+ u1{u∈(0,1)}
)
=
1
2
σ2 (Φ(r +m)− Φ(r)) +
∫
(0,∞)
Π(du)
(
1− e−Φ(r)u
Φ(r)
− 1− e
−Φ(r+m)u
Φ(r +m)
)
.
Substituting this in (3.8), we obtain the result.

Proof of Lemma 3.3. The result for the case σ > 0 is clear because, by (3.3),W (q)(0) = 0 andW (q)′(0+) =
2/σ2 for any q > 0. Suppose σ = 0. Then as in the proof of Lemma 4.4 of [27], we have
lim
x↓0
[
W (r)
′
(x)−W (r+m)′(x)] = lim
λ↑∞
∫ ∞
0
λe−λx
[
W (r)
′
(x)−W (r+m)′(x)
]
dx
= lim
λ↑∞
[
λ2
κ(λ)− r −
λ2
κ(λ)− (r +m)
]
= −m lim
λ↑∞
[
λ
κ(λ)− r
λ
κ(λ)− (r +m)
]
= 0.
Here the last equality holds because for any q > 0, due to Fatou’s lemma and
∫
(0,1)
xΠ(dx) =∞,
κ(λ)− q
λ
= c+
∫
(0,∞)
(
e−λx − 1
λ
+ x1{0<x<1}
)
Π(dx)− q
λ
λ↑∞−−→∞.
This together with W (r)(0) = W (r+m)(0) = 0 shows the result. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.4. The proof is trivial when B∗ = −∞ and hence assume that B∗ ∈ (−∞,∞].
(i) Suppose X is of bounded variation and fix B̂ < B∗. By (3.14), we have K(r,m)1 (B̂) < 0. But
by (3.13), this implies E(B̂+; B̂) < 0, violating (2.5). Therefore, those B satisfying (2.5) must lie on
[B∗,∞).
(ii) Suppose X is of unbounded variation and again fix B̂ < B∗. For any sufficiently small δ > 0 such
that K(r,m)1 (x) < 0 for every B̂ < x < B̂ + δ, we have by Proposition 3.1
inf
B̂≤x≤B̂+δ,B̂≤y≤x
∂
∂B
E(x;B)
∣∣∣∣
B=y
≥ inf
0≤y≤δ
Θ(r+m)(y) inf
B̂≤B≤B̂+δ
|K(r,m)1 (B)|
− sup
0≤y≤δ
{Θ(r)(y)−Θ(r+m)(y)} sup
B̂≤B≤B̂+δ
|K(r)2 (B)|.
This converges to some strictly positive value as δ ↓ 0 by Lemma 3.3, (3.3) and (3.7); namely,
inf
B̂≤x≤B̂+δ0,B̂≤y≤x
∂
∂B
E(x;B)
∣∣∣∣
B=y
> 0,
for some δ0 > 0. But by (3.13), E(B̂+δ0+; B̂+δ0) = 0, implying E(B̂+δ0; B̂) < 0, violating (2.5). 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Define, as the Laplace exponent ofX under P1 with the change of measure dP
1
0
dP0
∣∣∣
Ft
=
eXt−κ(1)t,
κ1(β) :=
(
σ2 + c−
∫
(0,1)
u(e−u − 1)Π(du)
)
β +
1
2
σ2β2 +
∫
(0,∞)
(e−βu − 1 + βu1{u∈(0,1)})e−u Π(du).
Then, κ1(Φ(q)− 1) = κ(Φ(q))− κ(1) = q − κ(1) for any q > 0; see page 215 of [24]. This shows
κ(1)− r
1− Φ(r) =
κ1(Φ(r)− 1)
Φ(r)− 1 = σ
2 + c−
∫
(0,1)
u(e−u − 1)Π(du)
+
1
2
σ2(Φ(r)− 1) +
∫
(0,∞)
(e−(Φ(r)−1)u − 1
Φ(r)− 1 + u1{u∈(0,1)}
)
e−u Π(du),
κ(1)− (r +m)
1− Φ(r +m) =
κ1(Φ(r +m)− 1)
Φ(r +m)− 1 = σ
2 + c−
∫
(0,1)
u(e−u − 1)Π(du)
+
1
2
σ2(Φ(r +m)− 1) +
∫
(0,∞)
(e−(Φ(r+m)−1)u − 1
Φ(r +m)− 1 + u1{u∈(0,1)}
)
e−u Π(du).
Subtracting the former from the latter, we obtain the result. 
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